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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

RONALD ALBERT ABRAM, a/k/a
Ronald A. Rasmussen,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.

12609

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a Bastardy Action brought pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated 1953, § 77-60-1 et seq., as amended.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Criminal suit was filed against defendant-appellant
for the crime of Bastardy. Trial by jury was held before
the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, a Judge of the Third
Judicial District Court of the State of Utah, at St. George,
Washington County, State of Utah. Defendant-appellant
was found guilty of the crime of bastardy.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks that the jury verdict and judg.
ment on the verdict be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees substantially with the statement
of facts as set forth in Appellant's brief but wishes to add
the following:
Appellant and Prosecutrix were considering marriage
during the summer of 1969. Appellant left to enroll at
Brigham Young University in September of 1969 but returned to St. George around the 25th of September. On
or about that date appellant had sexual relations with
prosecutrix, which resulted in pregnancy of prosecutrix.
Appellant refused to marry prosecutrix and an action of
bastardy was brought under the Bastardy Act, 77-60-1
et seq., U. C. A. (1953), as amended.
Appellant, Ronald Albert Abram, was convicted of :
the crime of bastardy after a jury trial held before the ·
Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, a Judge of the Third
Judicial District of the State of Utah, at St. George,
Washington County, State of Utah, on April 14, 1971.
A court order had been issued dated March 17, 1971, :
in which appellant's motion to suppress the introduction
of a letter purported to have been sent by appellant was
denied. This letter was entered as an element of proof
by respondent.
The court allowed testimony concerning appellant's
associations with men other than respondent up to June
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of 1969. After testimony by respondent's doctor, establishing the period of conception, the court limited this
testimony to the period of September 15th to October
15th.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
IN LIGHT OF THE MORE RECENTLY
PASSED UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY,
78-45a-1 et seq., UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
(1953), PROSECUTION OF THE BASTARDY
ACT, 77-60-1 et seq., U. C. A. (1953), AS
AMENDED DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A
DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAW AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
Appellant contends that he had been denied equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment and cites the case of State v. Shondell, 22
Utah 2d 343, 453 P. 2d 146 (1960), citing McDonald v.
Commondwealth of Massachusetts, 180 U. S. 311, 21 Sup.
Ct. 389, 45 L. Ed. 543. The Shondell case refers to two
statutes, one of which was a misdemeanor and the othell
of which was a felony. This is clearly distinguishable
from the defendant's case as the Bastardy Act and the
Uniform Act on Paternity have precisely the same remedies. Utah Code Ann. § 77-60-7 (1953), as amended,
states:
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"In case the issue is found against the defendant
... the court shall order that he pay to the clerk
of the court a reasonable sum for support, main.
tenance and education of the child until said chila
shall reach its 18th birthday, together with the
actual hospital and medical expense incurred by
the mother in prenatal care and delivery of sucn
child...."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-60-11 (1953), dealing with bastardy
support states:
"In case of wilful default in the payment when
due of any installment according to the condition
of the bond or judgment the court may adjudge
the defendant guilty of contempt by reason o!
such nonpayment ... "
The Uniform Act on Paternity, Utah Code Ann. ~ 7~
45a-1 et seq. (1953), as amended, has the same remedies
as the Bastardy Act.
Utah Code Ann.§ 78-45a-1 states:
"The father of a child which is or may be born
out of wedlock is liable . . . for the reasonable expense of the mother's pregnancy and confinemenl
and for the education, necessary support ana
funeral expenses of the child."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-5 states:
"The district court has jurisdiction of an action
under this act and all remedies for and enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy ~a
confinement for a wife and for the educati?~
necessary support, or funeral expenses for legiti·
mate child apply."
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Thus, contempt proceedings would be a proper remedy
to enforce a judgment which was obtained under the Uniform Act on Paternity, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-1 et
seq. (1953), as amended, as well as the Bastardy Act.
In protecting Fourteenth Amendment rights the
court in the case of State v. Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d 95,
355 P. 2d 689 (1960) states:
"The discrimination must be unreasonable or arbitrary to be unconstitutional. In construing a statute, all doubt should be resolved in favor of constitutionality." (Citing People v. Pibor, et al., 85
Cal. App. 789, 260 P. 303 and State v. Mason,
(1938), 94 Utah 501, 78 P. 2d 920, 117 A. L. R.
330.)
As forestated, the ultimate remedies of the Bastardy Act
and the Uniform Act on Paternity are the same and thus
cannot be construed to be unreasonable or arbitrary and
should be found to be constitutional.

POINT II.
THE BASTARDY ACT, 77-60-1, 2, AND 3, U.
C. A. (1953), AS AMENDED HAS NOT BEEN
REPEALED BY IMPLICATION BY THE
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY, 78-45a-1
et seq., U. C. A. (1953).
A. To repeal a statute or any portion of a statute
by implication, the court must look to the intent of the
legislature. The Uniform Act on Paternity, U. C. A.,
~ 78-45a-1 et seq. (1953), as amended, was introduced
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into the 1965 Legislature as House Bill 33. This propos~
statute was essentially a draft of the Uniform Act or
Paternity found in the Uniform Laws Annotated, W~
Publisher 1966. Section 17 of the Uniform Act on Patern
ity, Uniform Laws Annotated, and House Bill 33 providel
for the repeal of the Bastardy Act through the followin;
language:
"All laws or parts of acts inconsistent with till
act are hereby repealed."
The legislature deliberately and intentionally deleted th!
portion of House Bill 33 when passing the Uniform Art
on Paternity, U. C. A. § 78-45a-l, et seq. (1953), lli
amended. The clear intent of the legislature was to con
tinue the validity of the Bastardy Act, U. C. A. § 77-60-l.
et seq. ( 1953) , as amended, as an effective weapon thal
a pregnant woman could use to bring the reputed fathe1
of her child before the court. To repeal the Bastard\
Act would be to effectively reduce the forces of compul·
sion by which a father of an illegitimate child can be com
pelled to support such child. Where expressed tenns d
repeal are not used, the presumption is always again':
intention to repeal an earlier statute. U. S. v. Kushner
C. C. A. N. Y., 135 F. 2d 668, cert. den., 36 S. Ct. 144i
320 U. S. 212, 87 L. Ed. 1850, reh. den., 64 S. Ct. 32, 3X
U. S. 808, 88 L. Ed. 488 (1943); California Drive-Im
Restaurant Association v. Clark, 140 P. 2d 657, 22 Cal
2d 287 (1943).
The 1971 Legislature also amended Utah Code Ann
§ 77-60-12, dealing with custody of an illegitimate chil0

.,
under the Bastardy Act, and Utah Code Ann. § 77-60-14,
dealing with the marriage of parties under the Bastardy
Act, supplying additional evidence of its intention to retain the validity of the Bastardy Act.
The principal of repealing a statute by implication is not favored by the Utah Supreme Court. See
Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Public Service Commission,
103 Utah 186, 134 P. 2d 474 (1943) and Thompson v.
Harris, 106 Utah 32, 144 P. 2d 761 (1943). To repeal the
statute by implication requires the court to place or to
put itself in the place of the legislature and determine
the intent of the legislature. This is not required in light
of the enactment of the Uniform Act on Paternity, Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45a-1 et seq. (1953), as amended, as the
Legislature has clearly shown their intention when enacting such statute.
B.

POINT III.
A TYPEWRITTEN UNSIGNED LETTER
WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.
In considering all surrounding circumstances, the
identity and authenticity of the letter was reasonably
established.
In a number of cases where necessity demanded proof
other than proof of handwriting, it has been held that
the authenticity or genuineness of a letter may be established by circumstantial evidence.
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"A letter received through the mails is not admis.,1.
ble in evidence when offered by the recipient, withou/
proof of its authenticity," Kent & Downs v. Wadlei
Southern Railway Co., 136 Ga. 857, 759, 72 S. E. 4Ii
(1911), but proof of its execution may be shown by cir.
cumstantial evidence, Cocroft v. Cocroft, 158 Ga. 714,
124 S. E. 346 (1924); Cotton States Mutual Insuranci
Co. v. A. J. Clark, 114 Ga. App. 439, 151 S. E. 780 (1966);
and 9 A. L. R. 984.
In Singleton v. Bremer, 16 S. C. L. (Harp.) 20!
( 1824) , it was held that a letter received through the mali
was admissible into evidence even though it was pw·
portedly sent by a person who could not write by a show·
ing that it stated facts which could only be known t.o, or
relate to, the purported sender. The case followed tbf
theory that necessity justified a resort to circumstantial
evidence to authenticate a letter.
In Commonwealth v. Drum, Appellant, 42 Pa. Supe1.
Ct. 156 ( 1910) , the court looked to the total circumstanre
surrounding an unsigned typewritten letter and then ad
mitted the letter into evidence. Facts considered were:
The postmark on the letter was from the place where tbr
purported writer carried on his business; the subject o!
the letter was one particularly within the knowledge d
the person who was claimed to have written it; and tb1
purported writer had a special motive.
Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2148, Third Ed., states:
"However, where the necessity above mention~
does in fact exist, namely, the impossibility of o~

taining handwriting testimony, it would seem to
follow that resort must be had to the evidence
from contents - at any rate, in some circumstances or upon the facts of a particular case."
In People v. Adams, 127 N. W. 354, 162 Mich. 371
(1910), the court admitted into evidence certain letters
and telegrams although it was not proven that the purported writer signed them in any way other than through
the connection that they intrinsically showed to a previous conversation.
In this case for seduction the complainant's mother
testified that she had been approached by the defendant
who told her of his wrong-doing and that he was in fact
a married man but would soon get a divorce. The defendant purportedly sent letters to the complainant's
mother and telegrams which bore his name and contained
allusions to the subject theretofore discussed between
them. The court concluded:
"We think that they were competent evidence,
although it was not shown that he signed, or sent
them in any other way than through the connection that they intrinsically showed to the previous
conversation, and the arrangement that he should
write. This furnished some evidence of their genuineness, which thus became a question for the
jury."

The evidence clearly indicates that appellant wrote
the subject letter. Although the postmark was smudged,
the zip code clearly shows that the letter was mailed from
Provo· also the last letter of the word Provo appears
'
clearly' (T-63).
It was established that appellant was
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enrolled in school at Brigham Young University at the
time this letter was sent from Provo.
The letter refers to certain documents in the first
paragraph. These documents were those to which appellant referred in a telephone conversation held a few days
prior to the letter's delivery between the appellant and
the prosecutrix's mother (T-56). Clearly, this information indicates a manifest probability that the subject
matter of the letter was known only to the apparent
writer, the appellant, and to the person to whom it was
written and mailed.

1

Mrs. Etta Cheeney testified concerning the telephone
conversation and letter; (T-54 through 56):
Q.

Did he call you the following Thursday?

A.

He did.

Q.

Where were you when you took the call?

A. At home.
Q. Do you know where he called you from?
A.

No, I don't.

Q.

But did you talk to him?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q. What was said?
A. He told me he had thought the ~atter
over and that he would be wiling, he was gomg
marry Lorraine if I would sign, have signed certam
statements and have them notarized and_ sent to
him, he wouldn't be responsible for anyth1~g af~r
the baby came. Like support or an_Ything lik~
this. That he could finish his schooling. And

!°

,
i
1

L
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told him I would sign them and I would also send
some money to come down here to St. George on.
Q. And he said that he wanted you to sign
some papers?

A. Yes.
Q. Is that right? Did he say what kind of
papers?

A. He wanted me to notarize some statements, and went to an attorney, I went to an attorney and told this attorney what he wanted,
and the attorney said that it wouldn't be legal
and I didn't need to do it. He said that I shouldn't
have to be forced to do things like this. It wouldn't
be legal. So for me to just go ahead and send him
the money. So I did send him the money, but I
didn't send him any statements. I just sent him
the money.

*

*

*

Q. At the time you talked to him over the
phone, did you discuss any marriage?

A. He said he would marry Lorraine.
Q.

And what else did he say?

A. Also said that I would sign these statements and send them to him, these notarized
statements that he wouldn't be responsible, that
he would go ahead and get, get married, and then
he would go back and finish his school. If I would
send him some money so he could come down here
to do it on.
Q. But you never did send him the papers
up, is that right?
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. A. I didn't send no papers to him. I sent
him money, but no papers.
. Q. When did yon next have any communica.
tion with the defendant?

A.

I got a letter from him.

Q. Do you know about when you got the
letter?
A.

Just a few days after the phone call.

Q. And do you know where the letter crune
from?

A. It was postmarked Provo.
Q. And who was the letter come to you at your home?

did the letter

A. Yes, it did.
Q. And who was the letter addressed to, do
you remember?
A.

To me.

The letter which was entered into evidence, stated
in the first paragraph the letter's purpose: because Mrs.
Cheeney "may have wondered the reason for such a statement." This referred to the statements appellant asked
Mrs. Cheeney to notarize. He tried to justify his request

for such statements through the letter.

Appellant argues that the prosecutrix could also have i
known the subject matter of the letter. This contention
goes to the credibility of the letter, not to its admissibil·
ity.

1
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Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2149 refers to the policy
behind allowing a letter into evidence based solely upon
the letter's content:
"If there were a serious possibility of abuse, this
step would not be advisable. But in fact there is
also a danger in the opposite direction; for the
difficulty of authenticating such a document is
sometimes taken advantage of by those who wish
to be able to disavow their authorship. It is, no
doubt a question of experience, i.e. which danger
is actually the greater. On a whole it would seem
safe to authorize the trial court, in discretion,
to allow to go to the jury a typewritten communication bearing sufficient indication of authenticity
in its content and its letterhead."

It is further submitted that admitting the letter into
evidence was not prejudicial error. In the absence of the
letter the jury's verdict would have been the same.
The letter was only one aspect of the evidence which
tended to prove the parenthood of the appellant. The
appellant had spoken of marriage with prosecutrix (T-9).
Appellant had opportunity to have sexual intercourse
with prosecutrix during the period of conception, as he
had returned from Provo on or about September 25, 1969
(T-9). Appellant at no time denied parenthood of the
child to prosecutrix's mother (T-91). The jury could see
that the baby had marked similarities to appellant; they
both have brown eyes, although the mother's eyes are
blue, they have the same coloring, cheek structure, and
dimples (T-65). There was no evidence refuting the
prosecutrix's testimony.
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The jury would have reached the same verdict without reference to the letter and admitting it was not prejudicial error.
POINT IV.
CONFINING TESTIMONY CONCERNING
PROSE CUTRI X'S ASS 0 CI AT I 0 N WITH
MALES OTHER THAN APPELLANT TO A
PERIOD OF ONE MONTH WAS PROPER.
Sufficient evidence was offered which allowed the
trial court in its discretion to limit testimony as to the
period of conception.
Appellant states that the only testimony establishing
the period of gestation is that of prosecutrix and that of
the doctor. The doctor's opinion was based upon that of
prosecutrix.
There is ample case law establishing the fact that in
a bastardy action, testimony of the prosecutrix need not
be corroborated. State v. Reese, 43 U. 447, 135 P. 270
(1913); State v. Kranendonk, 79 U. 239, 9 P. 2d 176
(1932); 1 A. L. R. 635.
U. C. A. 1953, 77-60-5 states:
"On the trial of every issue of fact as to the bas·
tardy the mother and the defendant shall be com·
petent witnesses and their credibility shall be left
to the jury."
Respondent, when visiting her own doctor concerning the
birth of her child, told him when she had her last period.
birth of her child, told him when she her last period. The
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The doctor later delivered the baby at full term. The fact
the baby was full term was testified to by the doctor (T106), prosecutrix's mother (T-64), and prosecutrix (T30). No evidence was offered to directly contradict the
evidence.
The court reasonably based the limitation of the period of conception upon testimony of the prosecutrix's
doctor, Dr. Staheli. After testifying the child was fullterm at birth the doctor was asked by Mr. Isom, District
Attorney, as follows:
Q. Based on your examination of her attending this case, would you have, could you give me
a statement on an estimate of when the conception took place?

A. Well, we go by the date of the last menstrual period and the date she gave me was September 15, 1969. Therefore, the conception probably would have occurred between September 25
and October the 5th on an average. On an average
we count as 14 days following the first day of the
last menstrual period. But it certainly can occur
within that ten-day range.
Q. Would there, what would the, what would
the chances be that she could have become pregnant after the 5th of October?

A. Well, the chances would become much
less after the 5th and extremely unlikely within a
few days after that.
Q. Say by the 15th of October, could she
have, could she have become pregnant at that time
or after.
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A. I would think, and I think it would have
been extremely unlikely, that she could have become pregnant at that time.
Q. Now, she couldn't have been pregnant
prior to the 15th of September. Is that right?
A.

Right.

Q. So it would have had to have been some
time between the 15th of September and say the
5th of October?
A.

I would say so, yes.

Q. What is the normal period of gestation,
Dr. Staheli?
A. Normally figure 280 days, which again, is
an average. A few days either way is very com·
mon.
Q. It could vary a few days before or after,
is that correct?

A. That is right.
Q. But if the baby was full term, it normally
wouldn't be much after that, is that right, or less
than that?
A. I am sorry.
Q. If the baby was a full term baby, not pre·
mature, and the chances of it being less than that
time, what are they?
A. Well, being significantly less than 280
days, certainly, a week one way or the other isn't
going to make much difference, probably.

Berry v. Chaplin, 169 P. 2d 442, 449, 74 Cal. App. 2d
652 (1942) states:

1
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"Prima facie evidence is that which suffices for
the proof of a particular fact, until contradicted
and overcome by other evidence . . . The direct
evidence of one witness who is entitled to full
faith and credit is sufficient for proof of any fact,
except perjury and treason . . . Whether Miss
Berry was entitled to full credit, was for the jury,
and the trial judge to determine. Estate of Gird,
157 Cal. 534, 542, 108 P. 499, 137 Am. St. Rep.
131; Estate of Snowball, 157 Cal. 301, 305, 107
P. 598. She testified that she and defendant had
four acts of sexual intercourse at or about the date
when, in the ordinary course of nature, the child
must have been begotten."
Respondent offered a prima facie case against appellant upon her own testimony which the jury was entitled
to believe. The time period to be considered by the court
was that time in which the ordinary course of nature, the
child must have been conceived; September 15th to October 15th was within this period. The trial judge was
correct in relying upon the testimony of respondent and
the doctor in absence of evidence to the contrary. After
considering all facts presented in such testimony, the period of September 15th to October 15th, 1969 was reasonably and correctly assumed to be the period of conception.
The court in the Berry v. Chaplin, supra, case did
not have the issue before it as to the date of conception.
In that case it was stipulated by both the plaintiff's counsel and defendant's counsel that the child was conceived
on or about December 20, 1942. The period of conception
was not directly approached.
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Both the months of January and November were
mentioned by the court in considering the period of conception in the Chaplin case but the court's emphasis was
given to the single month of December:
"She testified that she had four acts of sexual intercourse at or about the date when in the ordinary course of nature, the child must have been
begotten. These acts occurred on the 10th, 23rd,
24th and 30th days of December, 1942."
The court continued:
"But even though complete or satisfactory proof
had been made of sexual acts by Miss Berry with
any other man on other occasions, it would still
have been the exclusive function of the jury to
determine whether defendant is the father of her
child by virtue of his act in December, 1942."
The court in its discretion can define the period of con·
ception based upon the only evidence before the court.
In the present case the court acted properly in excluding
testimony other than acts which occurred between Sep·
tember 15th to October 15th, which time was clearly
within the period when in the normal course of nature
the child must have been conceived where there was no
evidence to the contrary.
Although it was later limited to the period of one
month, the court in fact did allow testimony as to prose·
cutrix's association with males beyond the scope of Sep·
tember 15th to October 15th, 1969. In the trial transcript,
page 38, it states:

19
Mr. Scarth: Your honor, what I would like
to do is establish the acquaintances of the complaining witness, her male acquaintances.
Mr. Isom: Your Honor Mr. Scarth: Find out if she had anything to
do with them in 1969 prior to dating the accused,
and whether she had anything to do with them

after.

The Court: Well, she has testified she did not
after, and the court will find that prior to say,
June or July of 1969 would be too remote to have
possibly had conceived this particular child, born
June 22nd.
The above ruling by the court was in effect until the court
heard further expert testimony by Dr. Clark Staheli.
Before the doctor testified, appellant had called as witnesses Maynard Rasmussen (T-92), Mary Lee Rasmussen (T-97) and James Russell Bartorello (T-103). No
offer of proof was made through any of these witnesses
that respondent had had sexual relations other than with
appellant in any period even without the limit set by the
court.
The court was unable to ascertain that it was, in
fact, limiting testimony that would be probative of appellant's contentions. Appellant made no offer of proof that
would establish that respondent had sexual relations with
any person outside of the one month period designated
by the court.
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The court in United States v. Stoppelmann, 266 F.
2d 13 (1959), commented:
"There was no offer to prove what the witness il
permitted to testify, would have said. To warr~nt
a reversal it is incumbent upon an appellant t-O
show not only that technical error occurred but
that the error was prejudicial, without knowing
what the witness would have said if permitted t-0
testify, it is impossible for us to conclude that
defendant was prejudiced by the ruling now complained of. The general rule is that a ruling rejecting testimony is not reviewable in the absence
of an offer of proof."
None of the witnesses called by appellant testified
that they had any knowledge of any encounter or special
association with any man other than respondent, nor was
any evidence offered by appellant to refute the testimony
of respondent pertaining to her activities, or pertaining
to the testimony that the baby was full term. The court
properly limited testimony and as to the period of con·
ception.
There was no prejudicial error because the testimony
of the period of conception was limited to one month.
To be prejudicial error, the error must be such that if it
had not been committed the verdict probably would not
have been the same. The jury had the duty to consider
all evidence. After the respondent's unrefuted testimony,
it was established that intercourse did in fact take place
on or about September 25th, a period in which conception
could normally take place. There was enough evidence
offered to establish the guilt of appellant.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant was given a fair trial in this case and has
shown no valid reason why the court should not sustain
the verdict of the jury. The policy of the law is to bring
litigation to an end and not to grant new trials merely
because one of the parties is unsatisfied with the result.
As shown in Point I of this brief, appellant was not
denied his constitutional right of equal protection. The
procedures of the Bastardy Act, Utah Code Ann., Sec.
77-60-1 to 3, are constitutional in light of the Uniform
Act on Paternity, Utah Code Ann., Sec. 78-45a-1, et seq.
(1953), as amended.
As shown in Point II, the clear intention of the legislature was the continual validity of the Bastardy Act and
therefore no implied repeals should be found.
As shown in Point III the letter purported to have
been sent by appellant was properly admitted into evidence. A proper foundation had been laid and it was for
the jury to determine the letter's weight.
As shown in Point IV the trial court in its discretion
limited testimony as to the period of conception to a one
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month period. This was done only after substantial uncontroverted evidence had been presented.
Based upon all of the foregoing, respondent respect.
fully requests that the verdict of the jury and the judg.
ment entered thereon be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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